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Abstract 
An attempt is made to characterize a “knowledge governance approach” 
as a distinctive, emerging field that cuts across the fields of knowledge 
management, organisation studies, strategy and human resource 
management. Knowledge governance is taken up with how the 
deployment of administrative apparatus influences knowledge processes, 
such as sharing, retaining and creating knowledge. It insists on clear 
behavioural foundations, adopts an economizing perspective and 
examines efficient alignment between knowledge transactions with 
diverse characteristics and governance structures and mechanisms with 
diverse capabilities of handling these transactions. Various open research 
issues that a knowledge governance approach may illuminate are 
sketched. Although knowledge governance draws clear inspiration from 
organizational economics and “rational” organization theory, it recognizes 
that knowledge represents various challenges to more “closed” social 
science disciplines, notably economics.   
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An Emerging Field 
The purpose of this paper is to paint a portrait of an emerging field that cuts across 
the knowledge management, human resource management, organization and 
strategy fields. This field submits that knowledge processes (i.e., the creation, 
retention, and sharing of knowledge) (Argote 1999) can be influenced, and to a 
certain extent directed, through the deployment of administrative apparatus, such as 
organization structure and coordination mechanisms. This field may well be called 
“knowledge governance” to signify that it is taken up with the interplay between 
knowledge processes and organizational processes, and also to signify its 
indebtedness to organizational economics.1 The field of knowledge governance has 
partly arisen as a response to some clear knowledge gaps in the knowledge 
management field (and indeed in broader general concern with knowledge that has 
characterized management studies in the last one and a half decade). Most 
importantly, the KM field has paid surprisingly little attention to organizational 
theory  surprising, that is, because KM processes take place in an organizational 
context, and the use of organizational theory to elucidate the boundary conditions, 
etc. of such processes would appear to be natural.  In contrast, the knowledge 
governance approach makes ample use of existing organizational theory. In 
particular, organizational economics looms large, although representatives of the 
knowledge governance approach recognize that knowledge itself is not trivial to 
analytically approach and that in some ways it challenges more “closed” social 
science approaches, such as (formal) mainstream economics (e.g., Grandori and 
Kogut 2002).  
Why Knowledge Governance? 
Fellow-Travellers in the Knowledge Movement 
                                                 
1 The origin of the term “knowledge governance” is somewhat unclear. It seems, however, that the 
first use of it is in Grandori (1997).  For attempts to characterize knowledge governance as a 
distinctive approach that are related to this paper, see Foss and Mahnke (2003), Foss, Husted, 
Michailova and Pedersen (2005), and Foss (2005a). Grandori and Kogut (2002) also contains many 
pertinent observations.  
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It is no overstatement to say that “knowledge” has been all the rage for more than a 
decade in a number of fields in management studies (e.g., Grandori and Kogut 2002; 
Eisenhardt and Santos 2003). A veritable “knowledge movement” that cuts across 
traditionally separate disciplines in business administration has emerged. The 
strategy field has witnessed a proliferation of approaches that all place knowledge 
assets centerstage (e.g., Grant 1996); the international business field is in the process 
of developing a view of the multinational corporation as a knowledge-based entity 
(Tallman 2004); network ideas that stress connections between knowledge nodes are 
becoming increasingly influential (Kogut 2000); and, of course, “knowledge 
management” has become not only a huge body of literature, but also a widespread 
organizational practice (Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2003; Spender 2005).   
Those who are engaged in building the knowledge governance approach  and a 
more precise identification will be provided later  welcome the centrality ascribed 
to knowledge in these diverse approaches.  They agree that for a number of reasons 
(see Foss 2005a: Chapter 1 for a more comprehensive discussion), the management 
of knowledge assets of whatever kind has become a critical issue.  They agree that it 
is meaningful to speak of different kinds of knowledge, each implying different 
management needs. And they also agree that no single established business 
administrative field or social science perspective is likely to carry us all the way 
towards a comprehensive understanding of the management of knowledge.  In other 
words, those who subscribe/contribute to the knowledge governance are 
sympathetic fellow-travellers in the overall knowledge movement. 
Gaps in Knowledge Research 
Nevertheless, there are a number of features of the knowledge movement in general 
and of knowledge management in particular that are highly problematic.  Here is an 
inventory of the kind of problems that those who may subscribe to a knowledge 
governance approach may diagnose.  
At a fundamental level, it is something of a puzzle that it has become almost 
axiomatic that knowledge must always be at the basis of competitive advantage, for 
relatively little hard, quantitative evidence speaks directly to the issue.  Part of the 
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reason is, of course, that the links between knowledge assets, or organizational 
processes and practices involving such assets, and competitive advantage are very 
complex, and perhaps only fully intelligible through painstaking qualitative 
research.   
In particular, the links are mediated by organization, by such means as the 
deployment of information systems, incentive schemes, allocations of decision rights 
(“authority”), and so on. For example, the attempt to better exploit certain 
knowledge assets through knowledge sharing is typically implemented through 
various kinds of administrative machinery. Responsibility for the operation may be 
delegated to a manager (allocation of decision rights), incentives for knowledge 
sharing may be set up, monitoring mechanisms that make sure that knowledge that 
is shared (and for which rewards are paid) is actually relevant knowledge, 
employees may have to be incented to actually search for knowledge, etc.  
All of this is costly. However, surprisingly such costs are almost universally ignored 
in the knowledge management field (Foss and Mahnke 2003). Moreover, alternative 
kinds of administrative apparatus can be deployed to influence knowledge 
processes. But the relevant alternatives are seldom confronted in the knowledge 
management field. Relatedly, the question of whether, for example, knowledge 
sharing is always beneficial is seldom raised, at maximum knowledge sharing is 
implicitly assumed to be desirable; thus, explicit awareness of a tradeoff in 
knowledge sharing efforts is seldom encountered. However, a relevant alternative to 
knowledge sharing may often be more delegation of decision rights: If the problem 
is to make better use of existing knowledge, it may be better to allow the employees 
who hold this knowledge to make better use of it than to spread it to the rest of the 
organization. What is best depends, of course, on the net benefit associated with 
each alternative. However, such comparative assessments are virtually never 
performed in the KM field.  
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To be sure, organization issues do get mention in the KM field.2 But often, and 
perhaps usually, organization is introduced, as it was, in the aggregative mode.  
Thus, theorists discuss the role of “communities of practice” (Brown and Duguid 
1998) for influencing knowledge management tasks.  In general, there is a tendency 
to reason in terms of aggregates or collectives in large parts of the knowledge 
movement. Much of the emphasis on capabilities, dynamic capabilities etc. represent 
this (Felin and Foss 2005).  However, such a focus on collectives risk obscuring the 
real knowledge management task, which  like all managerial practice (Barnard 
1938),  must begin with the individual. 
A Signallement of the Knowledge Governance Approach 
Knowledge and Organization 
Assuredly, many writers have argued that organization is responsive to knowledge 
and that in turn organization may shape knowledge.  Thus, on a fundamental level 
the information-processing emphasis in organization theory of the 1960s and 1970s 
illustrates the first causality, and earlier, Hayek’s (1945) famous argument 
concerning the need for decentralization when relevant knowledge is “knowledge of 
time and circumstance” makes a similar point on an even more abstract level.  Less 
abstractly, the innovation management literature has long stressed that such 
organizational issues as role definition, team composition, the distribution of 
authority, etc. should be very much responsive to the nature of the development 
effort.   
However, organization also shapes knowledge.  Again at a fundamental level, the 
organizational division of labour implies that processes of knowledge creation 
become path-dependent. As Brian Loasby (1976: 133) perceptively noted, an 
organizational structure “... not only determines where an organization’s problems 
                                                 
2 The “knowledge-based theory of the firm” (Grant 1996) has not yet made the move from basic 
conceptualization to theory that clearly links characteristics of knowledge and of knowledge 
processes to organization; therefore, it is not a predictive theory and not one that is directly relevant 
to managers. 
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are worked on, but also helps to determine what problems they shall be, how they 
are defined, and what solutions will be attempted.”  Thus, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) 
pointed out that building “integrating mechanisms,” such as stage-overlapping 
product development processes and embedding these organizationally would 
facilitate thick communication across departments.  
Many other points of reference can be found in the strategy and organization 
literatures. More recently, there has been a proliferation of ideas on, for example, 
alliances and joint ventures as vehicles for knowledge-building (Hamel 1991), 
internal venturing as means of accomplishing the same goal (Eisenhardt and Brown 
1998), of high-performance HRM practices as driving innovation performance 
(Laursen and Foss 2003), on the “differentiated MNC” as a means of superior 
leverage of knowledge (Hedlund 1994), on “organizational knowledge structures” 
(Lyles and Schwenk 1992), and much else. These ideas all relate organization and 
knowledge issues on some level and to some extent. They are, however, very 
different and derived from different underlying base disciplines. It is not clear what 
unites them except a broad concern with the relation between organization and 
knowledge (Foss, Husted, Michailova and Pedersen 2005).   
However, some synthetic attempts do exist. Pondering the issue of what 
“knowledge approaches can contribute to organizational theory,” Grandori 
(Grandori and Kogut 2002: 225) recently observed that what has been added is “… a 
new ‘contingency’ factor for understanding organizational arrangements … 
Knowledge complexity, differentiation, and specialization, complementarity and 
interdependence are emerging as important contingencies affecting effective 
organization and governance solutions.” It is the contention of the present paper that 
it is possible to go even further and posit the existence of an emerging, distinctive 
approach to knowledge governance.  
Some Representative Knowledge Governance Contributions 
As a first take on an identification of the emerging knowledge governance approach, 
consider the following papers, all of which qualify as contributions to the knowledge 
governance approach.  
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Margit Osterloh and Bruno Frey “Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and 
Organizational Forms” (2000). The key point in Osterloh and Frey is that knowledge 
transfer is intimately connected to motivation which in turn is strongly influenced 
by specific organizational designs. The authors observe that firms increasingly 
introduce market elements to exploit the advantages of price mechanisms, by 
making exchanges between departments or actors more explicit and enabling them 
to reward according to the contribution to a firm’s profit. The contribution of an 
employee’s tacit knowledge to a team output however, cannot be measured and 
therefore paid accordingly. In tasks such as generating and transfer of knowledge, 
goals are difficult to formulate and task completion cannot be attributed to a 
particular employee. If knowledge is largely tacit and its diffusion is crucial to a joint 
output, the exchange of knowledge should remain inside a work team and not be 
outsourced or dissected into a profit centre. Since the transfer of tacit knowledge can 
not be assured by complete contracts and at the individual level an employee cannot 
be sanctioned for holding back tacit knowledge, it follows that in the absence of 
intrinsic motivation free-riding will take place.  However, firms have access to 
mechanisms (that markets don’t) to manage intrinsic motivation, such as 
participation which signifies agreement on common goals and raises employees’ 
self-determination, thereby strengthening intrinsic motivation and personal 
relationships, which allows for establishing psychological contracts based on 
emotional loyalties, which in turn raise the intrinsic motivation to cooperate.  
Osterloh and Frey conclude that firms should perhaps be seen in a new light, namely 
as institutions that are better capable of managing motivation than the market. 
Anna Grandori “Neither Hierarchy nor Identity: Knowledge-Governance 
Mechanisms and the Theory of the Firm” (2001). Grandori analyses the mechanisms 
that govern the transfer, sharing and integration of knowledge between and within 
firms. Firms have enriched their knowledge management systems with explicit 
mechanisms to provide incentives for knowledge integration. Grandori finds that 
not only hierarchical or communitarian mechanisms are usually applied, but also 
price-based (market-like) contracts and decentralized, but not identity based 
mechanisms. She concludes that the portfolio of mechanisms effectively employable 
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between firms to link nodes of specialized knowledge can hardly be distinguished 
from those mechanisms employable within firms. Furthermore, the different 
knowledge governance mechanisms are evaluated according to their cognitive 
possibility and their relative cost. Grandori proposes a two-tier assessment of 
mechanisms in which the first tier is made up of “possibility theorems” of the 
applicability domain of mechanisms and the second tier consist of comparative 
propositions on the superiority of the different feasible mechanisms. Characteristics 
of the relation between knowledge nodes which can influence the cognitive 
possibility are knowledge differentiation, knowledge complexity and degree of 
conflict of interests.3  A framework, in which these three antecedents are represented 
on three axes, is proposed and the antecedents are labelled either as high or low.  
Julian Birkinshaw, Robert Nobel and Johan Ridderstråle “Knowledge as a 
Contingency Variable: Do the Characteristics of Knowledge Predict Organization 
Structure?” (2002). Birkinshaw et al. examine whether the characteristics of a firm’s 
knowledge base influence the choice of organizational structure.  Two dimensions of 
knowledge are examined: observability (i.e., how easy is it to understand the activity 
by looking at and examining different aspects of a process or final product) and 
system embeddedness (i.e., the extent to which the knowledge in question is a 
function of the system or context in which it is embedded).  The empirical research is 
carried out on a data set obtained from 110 R&D unit managers in 15 Swedish 
multinational firms. Organizational structure is conceptualized by two factors: the 
autonomy of the R&D unit (i.e., the extent to which the unit is able to make strategic 
decisions without the involvement of corporate headquarters) and level of interunit 
integration (i.e., the state of collaboration among units, and the techniques used to 
achieve this collaboration). Birkinshaw et al. find that system embeddedness is the 
strongest predictor of interunit integration (p < 0.001) and also for R&D unit 
                                                 
3 Differentiation is measured as a factor, made up of several correlating variables (e.g. diversities in 
languages, differing perceptions of relevant information etc.) and expected to generate 
communication impasses and potential for conflict. Complexity is distinguished into computational 
(number of elements and possible connections) and epistemic complexity (difficulty of observing and 
diagnosing cause-effect relations). Conflict of interest is distinguished into low (homogenous or 
complementary interests) and high (all highly competitive games). 
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autonomy (p < 0.004). Observability is significant for interunit integration, but only 
at p < 0.05 and not statistically significant for R&D unit autonomy.  
Nicolai J. Foss “Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: Interpreting and 
Learning from the Rise and Decline of the Oticon Spaghetti Organization” (2003.) 
Infusing hierarchies with elements of market control has become a much-used way 
of simultaneously increasing entrepreneurialism and motivation in firms. However, 
this paper argues that such “internal hybrids,” particularly in their radical forms, are 
inherently hard to successfully design and implement, because of a fundamental 
incentive problem of establishing credible managerial commitments to not intervene 
in delegated decision-making. This theme is developed and illustrated, using the 
case of the world-leading hearing aids producer, Oticon.  In the beginning of the 
1990s, Oticon became famous for its radical internal hybrid, the ”spaghetti 
organization.” Recent work has interpreted the spaghetti organization as a radical 
attempt to foster dynamic capabilities by organizational means, neglecting, however, 
that about a decade later, the spaghetti organization has given way to a more 
traditional matrix organization. In contrast, this paper adopts a knowledge 
governance lens that suggests that a strong liability of the spaghetti organization 
was the above incentive problem: Frequent managerial meddling with delegated 
rights led to a severe loss of motivation, and arguably caused the change to a more 
structured organization.   
Jackson Nickerson and Todd Zenger “A Knowledge-based Theory of the Firm – The 
Problem-solving Perspective” (2004). Nickerson and Zenger seek to explain how 
alternative organizational forms influence the efficient production and protection of 
valuable knowledge. The unit of analysis for knowledge generation is a specific 
problem, whose value is determined by the values in the array of possible solutions 
and the cost of discovering a particularly valuable problem. The solution to complex 
problems is assumed to represent unique combinations or syntheses of existing 
knowledge. Problems differ according to their decomposability. Decomposable 
problems involve limited interaction, whereas non-decomposable problems involve 
extensive interaction. This has important implications for the type of searching for a 
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solution. Directional search refers to classic trial and error search. It is efficient only 
for decomposable activities. Heuristic search refers to a group or team cognitively 
evaluating probable consequences of design choices. 
Non-decomposable problems require individuals to share their specialized 
knowledge. The ability or motivation to share knowledge is impeded by two 
conditions: humans are cognitively constrained in the speed with which they learn 
and are prone to self-interest. The wide distribution of knowledge in conjunction 
with self-interest leads to two knowledge-related exchange hazards: knowledge 
appropriation and strategic knowledge accumulation. Consequently, efficiency 
considerations dictate the selection of an optimal governance mechanism and the 
provision of incentives. Three distinct governance mechanisms and their suitability 
for problems with differing characteristics are examined: markets, authority based 
hierarchies and consensus based hierarchies. Briefly, markets are ideally suited 
when problems are decomposable and directional search is desired; consensus-
based hierarchy creates high organizational costs and should only be adopted when 
the benefits for consensus are high, which is for problems that are highly complex 
and non-decomposable; finally, authority-based hierarchy is superior to markets in 
supporting heuristic search, but inferior in supporting directional search. The 
authors propose that authority based-hierarchies are best suitable for a range of 
problems that are moderately complex.  
Fundamental Ideas 
The above papers share a number of commonalities which makes it meaningful to 
think of them as representatives of an emerging approach. An attempt is made in the 
following to identify these commonalities.   
Microfoundations. It is characteristic of the above contributions that they are 
explicitly (e.g., Osterloh and Frey; Grandori) or more implicitly (Foss; Birkinshaw, 
Nobel and Ridderstråle) founded on methodological individualism. Thus, 
explanation starts with the individual, even though it may be permissible to 
introduce more collective concepts (e.g., organization structure) in the analysis.  
However, methodological individualism implies a reluctance to make use of 
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collective concepts without micro-foundations, such as “capabilities.”  Instead, 
explicit micro-foundations are sought. This implies modelling (i.e., making specific 
assumptions about) individual agents’ preferences, knowledge, incentives, etc.  No 
doubt, such an approach is to some extent influenced by one’s discipline; thus, most 
economists and all rational choice sociologists are methodological individualists.   
However, one can also see the emphasis on individualistic foundations as an attempt 
to meet the lacunae left in the knowledge movement by the overriding emphasis on 
collective constructs. As Argote and Ingram (2000: 156) lamented, to the extent that 
there has been progress in studying knowledge as the basis of competitive 
advantage, “… it has been at the level of identifying consistencies in organizations’ 
knowledge development paths and almost never at the level of human interactions 
that are the primary source of knowledge and knowledge transfer.”   
The knowledge governance approach attempts to address this “primary source” by 
taking an explicitly individualistic approach. For example, the fundamental idea of 
Osterloh and Frey (2000) is understandable only if the analysis explicitly begins from 
individual motivation.  The point is that these contributions develop insights that 
simply cannot be reached in lieu of an individualistic starting point.  
Unit of analysis(es). A constant source of confusion in the knowledge movement at 
large has been the absence of a clear identification of a unit of analysis (cf. 
Williamson 1999; Felin and Foss 2005). Is it routines (Nelson and Winter 1982), or 
capabilities (Richardson 1972), or dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 
1997), or practices (Spender 2005), or knowledge assets (Winter 1987), or some piece 
of “intellectual capital” as in much of the knowledge management literature? 
Particularly in the strategy and organization parts of the overall knowledge 
movement, the emphasis has been on the more collective constructs, such as routines 
or capabilities.  Sometimes these are seen as hierarchically related (as in Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Winter 2003). However, other parts of the knowledge movement utilize 
other collective constructs, such as communities of practice, and it is not clear how 
these collective constructs relate to routines or capabilities.   
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More generally, it is not clear how they relate to micro-level constructs (Felin and 
Foss 2005).  This means that significant parts of the knowledge movement works 
with an explanatory apparatus where collective outcomes (e.g., competitive 
advantage, knowledge sharing performance, overall knowledge creation, the 
boundaries of the firm) are explained in terms of collective concepts (e.g., 
capabilities, communities of practice) without an attempt to explicitly incorporate 
lower levels of analysis. 
The knowledge governance approach is agnostic on the precise nature of the unit of 
analysis. This can vary, depending on what is the purpose of the analysis.  However, 
it does insist that the unit of analysis is related to individual choice behaviour.  Both 
taking the “knowledge transaction” (Grandori 2001) or the “problem” as the unit of 
analysis is consistent with this.  It is more questionable whether taking the capability 
as a unit of analysis is.  
Dimensionalizing knowledge. Corresponding to the lack of clarity on what is the 
unit of analysis in significant parts of the knowledge movement is a lack of clear 
dimensionalization of the various knowledge constructs. The many studies of inter-
firm imitation and intra-firm knowledge transfer (e.g., Maritan and Brush 2003) tend 
to develop dimensions of, say, capabilities in an inductive manner and the explicit or 
implicit dimensionalizations differ from study to study.  Numerous taxonomies and 
distinctions have been produced on an a priori basis. An early contribution was 
Winter (1987) with its distinctions between tacitness vs. explicitness, system-quality 
vs. stand-alone, teachability vs. non-teachability, and complexity vs. non-
complexity. The Winter distinctions have been the basis for significant subsequent 
empirical work (Kogut and Zander 1993; Birkinshaw, Nobel and Ridderstråle 2002), 
and may be the best bid at a rather generally accepted dimensionalizing of 
knowledge.  Existing contributions to the knowledge governance approach are quite 
consistent with the Winter approach (e.g., Birkinshaw, Nobel and Ridderstråle 2002; 
Nickerson and Zenger 2004).  
Transactional problems. Given a characterization and dimensionalization of the unit 
of analysis in terms of knowledge, the scene is set for an examination of the 
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transactional problems that knowledge produces. Processes of creating, sharing, 
transferring, knowledge etc. are highly intertwined with “ordinary” business 
processes. Although knowledge sharing and knowledge creation may be partly 
unintended by-products of more conventional business processes, as, for instance, in 
conventional accounts of the learning-by-doing phenomenon,4 it is conceptually and 
theoretically  and often also practically  possible to think of knowledge 
processes as distinct processes.  
Knowledge processes have a number of salient features that set them apart from 
many “ordinary” business processes (e.g., coordinating logistics, running an 
assembly line, making a contract with a supplier, etc.) (Osterloh and Frey 2000).   
Thus, Foss, Husted, Michailova and Pedersen (2005) argue that knowledge processes 
are particularly challenging to analytically approach (and for similar reasons: to 
manage) because of, inter alia, the unavoidable emergence of “novelties”(unforeseen 
contingencies) in all learning processes; the significant elements of “team 
production” in knowledge processes (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Lindenberg 2003), 
that is, it is particularly hard and costly to measure the marginal product of each 
participant in the processes of creating and sharing knowledge… difficulties of 
ascertaining the outcome; problems of asymmetric information are particularly 
severe because much of the relevant knowledge is tacit so that it may be particularly 
hard to design mechanisms for eliciting such knowledge; detailed contingent plans 
for knowledge processes may be extremely costly to draft (Holmström 1989); etc. 
While these characteristics may characterize all business processes, they are more 
strongly present in knowledge processes. Per implication knowledge processes need 
particular ways of organizing and governing that can accommodate the peculiar 
informational, cognitive and motivational aspects of knowledge processes (Osterloh 
and Frey 2000; Grandori 2001; Lindenberg 2003).   
Knowledge governance. As a positive approach knowledge governance examines 
alignment between knowledge transactions  which differ in their characteristics  
                                                 
4 The extent to which learning by doing is really an unintended byproduct or rather something quite 
consciously designed is critically discussed in REF? 
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and governance structures and governance mechanisms  which differ in their 
competencies , using efficiency as the explanatory principle (cf. Williamson 1996; 
Buckley and Carter 1996). As a practical and normative enterprise, knowledge 
governance means deploying administrative apparatuses that mitigate costs of 
creating and sharing knowledge owing to the above characteristics of knowledge 
(Heiman and Nickerson 2002: 98).  Knowledge governance therefore means choosing 
governance structures (e.g., markets, hybrids, hierarchies) and governance and 
coordination mechanisms (e.g., contracts, directives, reward schemes, incentives, 
trust, management styles, organizational culture, etc.), so as to maximize the net 
benefits from processes of transferring, sharing and creating knowledge. 
Governance structures and governance mechanisms are important because they 
define the incentives and coordinate the actions of organizational members in 
knowledge processes (Foss and Mahnke 2003).  
Research Themes and Open Issues 
To see that there is a need for a knowledge governance approach, consider the 
following two examples of clearly important phenomena, namely 1) the governance 
of knowledge intensive firms (Starbuck 1992) or perhaps more precisely, “human 
capital organizations,” and 2) the importance of knowledge for competitive 
advantage.  These are not only important phenomena, they would also strike even 
the casual observer as phenomena to which a great deal of research effort has been 
devoted. However, a knowledge governance approach reveals the existence of 
serious lacunae in our knowledge about these and suggests how to remedy the 
knowledge gaps.    
Governance of Human Capital Organizations 
What is here called “human capital organizations” are organizations where a 
significantly larger part of value added can be ascribed to human than to physical 
assets. They encompass organizations ranging from R&D-intensive manufacturing 
firms to professional services firms.  They rely on scarce ”expert talent,” employ 
much-demanded “knowledge workers,” and, in general, mark a shift to a more 
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“knowledge-intensive” mode of production.  The present paper critically discusses 
the changing requirements for organizational control in human capital 
organizations.  In particular, it takes issue with an emerging thinking concerning this 
issue.   
The changes with respect to an increasing human content of firms’ productive inputs 
are often argued to take place in tandem with an increase of the “knowledge-
content” in outputs, a stepping up of innovative activity, an increasing 
differentiation of demand, increasing globalization, and increasingly inexpensive 
networked computing  complementary changes that are taken to indicate the 
emergence of the “knowledge economy” (Halal and Taylor, 1998; Prusac, 1998), or at 
least a new paradigm of “modern manufacturing” (Milgrom and Roberts 1990).      
Fundamental changes in economic organization are also implied by the increased 
prevalence of human capital organizations, as reflected in notions of the ”changing 
employment contract,” ”new organizational forms,” “internal disaggregation,” ”the 
molecular form,” etc.  In particular, many scholars have argued that the boundaries 
of firms are being radically transformed, not just because firms increasingly 
disaggregate (i.e., outsource, spin-off, etc.), but also because the very notion of firm 
boundaries is becoming increasingly problematic as (inalienable) human capital 
increasingly dominates (alienable) physical capital as the most important category of 
productive capital (Foss 2002 critically evaluates this discussion). This is because 
control of physical capital cannot anymore be used to the same extent as a source of 
organizational control over human capital, that is, employees (as in Hart 1995; 
Rousseau and Shperling 2003).    
As this suggests, the advent and increased prevalence of human capital 
organizations have profound implications for the application of organizational 
controls.  In fact, according to a viewpoint that has almost acquired the status of 
conventional wisdom, human capital organizations may be differentiated from 
“traditional” firms in terms of organizational control by relying less on direction 
through the exercise of authority, eschewing high-powered performance incentives, 
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and embracing “culture” and “clan” modes of organizational control (at least for the 
core group of employees) (e.g. Child and McGrath 2001; Coff 2001).  
However, a completely contrary view can be found in Teece (2003).  Teece explains 
how the organization of his own firm (Law and Economics Consulting Group, 
LECG), a professional services firm, is very much geared to the use of some modes 
of organizational control that lie as away as possible from the soft dimension.  In 
particular, while indeed the traditional blunt authority-mechanism (supervision, 
order-giving) is “extremely weak” in this firm, very high-powered performance 
incentives are used.  The two features are related, for by setting compensation for 
“experts” “… purely as a certain percentage α of the expert’s own individual bill-out 
rate times hours worked (as accepted by the client)” (Teece 2003: 909), strong 
incentives are coupled with a small need for monitoring.  Teece speculates that the 
specific organizational design of LECG (and there are many other features in 
addition to those briefly mentioned here) “… may well portend the future for 
professional service organizations endeavouring to leverage top talent” (p. 914).   
The point is, of course, not that Teece is right and those who argue differently are 
wrong, or vice versa. It is rather that we do not have good stories that allow us to 
theoretically discriminate between these alternative accounts. For activities with 
certain specific attributes, the conventional wisdom may be right; for activities with 
other attributes, it may not. Perhaps parts of the answer can be found in the Osterloh 
and Frey (2000) idea that intrinsic motivation is crucial if the sharing of tacit 
knowledge is an important concern; in that case the Teece model with its strong 
emphasis on “extrinsic motivation” may not work well. At any rate, a knowledge 
governance perspective is needed for framing these issues, so that testable 
hypotheses can be derived.  
Knowledge and Competitive Advantage 
Strategic management may well be the field in business administration where 
knowledge approaches have been developed and applied with the greatest success 
(in terms of influence in the field) (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992; Grant 1996; Spender 
1996; Kogut 2000). Thus, the dominant resource-based view, while not logically 
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committed to placing knowledge resources centerstage, nevertheless often does 
exactly this, the underlying arguments being that knowledge resources feed the 
renewal of competitive advantages and are particularly difficult to imitate. Thus, 
both the creation and the sustainability of competitive are conventionally seen as 
fundamentally rooted in knowledge resources. In particular, much interest has 
centred on constructs such as capabilities, and in recent years particularly dynamic 
capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997) that are argued to cause long-lived 
performance differentials across firms.   
From a knowledge governance perspective such reasoning is, however, highly 
unsatisfactory. There are two reasons for this.   
First, as suggested earlier, the underlying methodological collectivism flies in the 
face of the insistence on micro-foundations. To argue that an aggregate/collective 
outcome (i.e., the performance of the firm) can be explained in terms of another 
aggregate (capabilities or dynamic capabilities) is to make an explicit break with 
methodological individualism.  
A recent attack on this collectivism has been launched by Lippman and Rumelt 
(2003) who point out that arguing that “firms” earn a residual return called “profits” 
is highly misleading.  In particular, it obscures the complex process of appropriating 
value where the appropriation is not undertaken by firms (and certainly not by 
“capabilities”) but by the firm’s stakeholders that come equipped with different 
bargaining powers. Although this is not directly mentioned by Lippman and 
Rumelt, there is a feedback loop from the value appropriation of individual resource 
owners to value creation, because expectations with respect to how much of the rent 
stream can be appropriated will strongly influence a resource owners effort and 
investment incentives (Hart 1995). In this scheme, knowledge matters also because it 
is a prominent source of bargaining power.   
Second, and relatedly, the collectivist capabilities perspective in strategy neglects 
organization at its peril. Although capabilities are (to the extent that they are 
defined) often taken to be organizational processes that enable managers to carry out 
certain key tasks (e.g., Helfat and Peteraf 2003), organization itself seems almost 
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conspicuous by its absence in most capabilities work. By “organization” in a broad 
sense, may be understood the formal and informal allocation of decision (or 
property) rights (Jones 1983) and the mechanisms that enforce such rights. This 
rights allocation and the accompanying enforcement mechanisms constitute the 
distribution of authority, the attributes of administrative apparatus, organizational 
structure, and other aspects of formal organization, but clearly also relates to, for 
example, social ties and networks inside firms. All this matters, first, because an 
allocation of property rights is also an allocation of incentives (Barzel 1997), 
including incentives to search for knowledge, share knowledge, accumulate human 
capital, leverage knowledge capital, etc. (Foss and Mahnke 2003), and, second, 
because property rights also influence bargaining powers (Hart 1995).  For example, 
social ties and networks – much emphasized in KM research – are important for 
understanding the links between knowledge and superior returns, not just because 
of their potentially beneficial effects on returns, but also because such ties and 
networks grant legitimacy to the claims that employees may make on rents (Coff 
2005).   
The bottom-line is that the link between knowledge and CA cannot be assessed 
independently of considering the multiple stakeholders in the firm nexus and the 
incentives and property rights these stakeholders confront.  This brings organization 
directly into the picture.  However, missing in contemporary strategic management 
theory is an appreciation and understanding of the organizational factors that 
mediate between knowledge resources and competitive advantages.  
Is Knowledge Governance Economics Imperialism? 
It should now be apparent that the knowledge governance approach draws rather 
strongly on organizational economics, that is, contract theory (Holmström and 
Milgrom 1991; Hart 1995), transaction cost economics (Coase 1937; Williamson 1996), 
nexus of contracts theory (Alchian and Demsetz 1972), and work on bargaining and 
influence costs in organizations (Milgrom 1988). In the context of firm organization, 
organizational economics directs attention to the coordination and incentive 
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problems that are caused by the pathologies that unavoidably accompany an 
internal division of labour in a firm, such as asymmetric information, diluted 
performance incentives, measurement difficulties, bargaining problems, moral 
hazard, duplicative (redundant) efforts, etc. In turn, organizational economists have 
explained how a host of real-world organizational arrangements, such as various 
kinds of authority, payment schemes, delegation of decision rights, etc., serve to 
alleviate the severity of such problems. Their assessment of how well this is done is 
performed in terms of economic efficiency.  
The use made of organizational economics in the knowledge governance approach 
may be too much for many traditional (if such exist) KM researchers.  They may balk 
at the application of equilibrium and optimality ideas to knowledge processes.  
Furthermore, many KM researchers feel considerably more akin to the 
organizational behaviour stream of research in the organization studies field than to 
the organizational economics stream. It is therefore necessary to state that the 
knowledge governance approach is not an imperialistic economics undertaking.  
Economics imperialism, when used in a pejorative manner, means the application of 
mainstream economics modelling (i.e., applying the assumptions of stable 
preferences and maximization and the tool of equilibrium) to phenomena that they 
are inherently ill-suited to handle.  
The knowledge governance approach fully recognizes that knowledge often and in 
many ways pushes the economics envelope. The point that knowledge processes are 
particularly challenging to approach analytically because, inter alia, they are 
particularly likely to be plagued by problems of asymmetric information (Foss, 
Husted, Michailova and Pedersen 2005) has already been mentioned. However, the 
problem goes deeper: The fundamental epistemology underneath mainstream 
economics, represented by the “state space model” is indeed extreme (cf. Samuelson 
2005), and many standard assumptions of formal economics (e.g., the notion of 
“common knowledge”) eliminates substantial parts of KM by assumption. Thus, 
knowledge governance scholars will have no problems with the proposition that 
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bounded rationality needs to be taken much more seriously (See Grandori 2001; 
Nickerson and Zenger 2004).  
However, the knowledge governance approach does argue that “knowledge 
processes,” notably the creation and sharing of knowledge can be influenced by 
administrative means.  The links between the influencing and the outcomes may be 
complicated. However, they are accessible to sustained scientific inquiry. And the 
knowledge governance approach entertains the working hypothesis that knowledge 
processes can be systematically influenced by “governance”, that is, organizational 
control (Foss and Mahnke 2003). In elucidating this basic hypothesis, knowledge 
governance researchers have found organizational economics insights particularly 
helpful, while also recognizing that it is possible to apply ideas from agency theory, 
property rights, etc. without necessarily borrowing into the epistemological legacy 
of mainstream economics (for example, one can accept that property rights structure 
incentives without accepting the above axiom of omniscience).   
Moreover, knowledge governance researchers recognize that organizational 
economics may often be a quite blunt instrument with which to attack issues of 
knowledge governance. Thus, most contributions to organizational economics 
assume that motivation is extrinsic (Osterloh and Frey 2000). Second, although not 
formally committed to this, organizational economics assumes that all motives are 
entirely selfish. This flies in the face of casual observation as well as experimental 
evidence (Fehr and Gächter 2000). An implication is that organizational economics 
may give the wrong picture of the actual amount of, for example, “altruistic” 
knowledge sharing in organizations. Third, organizational economics has 
traditionally not made much out of “soft” organizational issues, such as culture, 
organizational justice, psychological contracts, organizational communication and 
the like. Thus, while this body of theory provides an interesting framing of many of 
the basic reasons why knowledge processes may pose particular governance 
problems, it is also likely to provide a lopsided picture of knowledge processes in 
actual firms.  Therefore, systematic attempts to include sophisticated treatments of 
motivation and cognition alongside organizational economics ideas are high on the 
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knowledge governance agenda (cf. Osterloh and Frey 2000; Grandori 2001; 
Lindenberg 2003).   
Conclusions 
This brief essay has attempted to paint a portrait of an emerging field in the broader 
knowledge movement in management studies, here called the “knowledge 
governance approach.” The approach deals with those issues relating to the 
interplay between knowledge processes and organization that seem to be so strongly 
under-researched (and unresolved) in conventional  KM. Knowledge governance 
writers lean heavily if by no means exclusively on notions from organizational 
economics. In particular, it draws inspiration from the notion that a clear 
knowledge-based unit of analysis be identified and dimensionalized (e.g., a 
knowledge transaction or a problem) and that the relevant unit of analysis is aligned 
with governance structures and mechanisms on the basis of efficiency.  Still, 
knowledge governance writers acknowledge that many issues relating to learning, 
perception, judgment and motivation may not be well be treated in a knowledge 
governance framework  and these may be better left for ”traditional” KM research.  
For this reason, it is arguable that the knowledge governance approach and KM are 
complements rather than substitutes.   
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